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In the 1950s and 1960s, efforts to develop a theory of economic growth
proceeded along two main, and largely independent, lines. On one hand, there was
a line of research concerned with a theory of economic growth pertatntng chiefly
to those characteristics believed to be particular to developing countries. On
the other hand, neoclassical growth theory was developed, stimulated by the
seminal work of Solow.
Initially, the focus of those concerned with the economic growth of the
developing countries was primarily upon ways of achieving more rapid capital
accumulation in the context of a dual—economy, labor—surplus, model in which a
variety of "structural rigidities" and market imperfections were thought to have
been responsible for the economic backwardness ci developing countries. Attention
therefore centered on reasons for backwardness, and the role of government tn
overcoming market failures.
Neoclassical growth theory, iy contrast, was developed on the assumptions
that markets function well and that the production function (with at least labor
and capital as inputs) had constant returns to scale. Growth in the long run
could therefore originate only through technical progress.
Over time, the attention of those seeking a theory of development shifted
from a primary concern with capital accumulation in dual economy models toTh
broader effort to understand the interaction of factor accumulation and govern—
uouke University.ment poLtctes in the development process. This research was stimulated in Large
part by the experience of developing countries. A key stylized fact was that
growth rates were widely dtvergent among developing countries, and that economic
polictes ——especiallywith respect to the foreign sector ——wereone crucial
factor that dtffered between raptdly and slowly growing countries. In the lore
of trade and development economists, the fact that Korea's average annual rate
of growth of real GNP rose from under 5 percent in the 1950a to over 10 percent
tn subsequent decades was associated in part with the shift in the trade and
payments regime. By the 1980e, other countries had also experienced large
apparent changes tn rates of growth and of exports and the empirical regularity
appeared confirmed. 1
By contrast, tnterest n neoclassical growth models appeared to fade by the
late 1960s. The assussptton of constant returns to scale evidently implied that
economic growth would eventually halt unless new technologies emerged: for any
gtven prcduction functton, labor force growth rate, and savings behavior, these
models predtcted an approach to a steady state per capita income level.
In the mid—1980s, however, Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986) began considering
models in whtch the presence of plausible externalities or increasing returns to
scale could explatn the continuation of more—or—less constant growth rates over
long time periods. The results were impressive and have led to a revival of
tnterest in growth models, based essentially upon neoclassical premises, but with
externalities or increasing returns capable of generating an escape from the
"steady state conclusions of earlier work.2
1See, for example, Balassa (1989).
2For recent extensions, see, for example, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny
(1989), and Romer (1990).To date, however, the new economic growth models generally assume efficient
resource allocation in all economies; sources of differences in growth rates
emanate from differences in earlier paths of accumulation and output, but not in
the degree to which governmental policiee differ or in the efficiency with which
resources are consequently allocated. There is a danger that the new economic
growth Literature and the development economics Literature will once again fail
to connect.
Recently, Barro (1989s and l989b) began closing the gap by examining the roLe
of governments in new economic growth models, taking into account human capital
formation and savings behsvior. In his models, government investment expenditures
contribute positively to output.Infrastructure is assumed to be effectively
provided free of charge to potential users. garro assumes that more
infrastructure augments the productivity of resources in private production. He
separates government spending into this "productive spending," from spending on
consumption, with the former expected to be positively correlated with growth and
the latter negatively. His tests using Summers and Heston's (1988) data from 72
countries bear this cut.
In Barro's model, consumption expenditures simply detract from available
investible resources. In this paper, we go further, attempting to test the
development economist's perceptions of the negative contributions of governmental
activities, ss well as the positive contributions of other activities, to growth.
This paper provides further evidence on the importance of government behavior for
economic growth and, in so doing, attempts to start building a bridge between the
development economics literature and the new growth theory. The focal point is
the recognition that governments do more than spend and tax in manners that
maximize sociaL welfare functions: they influence incentives and regulate in ways
4that affect private behavior, and their spending, even on infrastructure, is not
always optimaL. A first section outLines some of the styLized facts that have
emerged from development economics regarding governmental behavior and its impact
on growth. A second section then describes our approach to testing for both
positive and negative effects of government activities and describes our data.
A third section presents the results. A final section provides some tentative
conclusions and suggests iurther lines of research.
We have been guided in part by Jones •contributionsto the evolution of both
development theory and to understanding of two—sector models of trade and growth
in important ways. He demonstrsted how factor market distortions —theresuLt of
government interventions that raise the urban wage or lower the cost of capital —
couldaffect the allocation of resources and negatively affect trade (Jones
1971). His contributions to understanding the Heckscher—Ohlin—Samuelaon model
(Jones 1956, 1965, 1977 and 1979) have provided an analytical underpinning for
empirical analysis of the contribution of differences in factor proportions and
trade to economic growth.3 As will be seen below, trade policies —asreflected
in our estimates as well as in earlier works in the development literature —do
affect growth rates, and an important reason is the opportunities that trade
provides for a developing tountry to use its abundant factors of production
effectively.
1. Government Policies in Develooine Countries
In practice, many developing countries have adopted economic policies that
are highly tnimical to economic growth. These include: monetary and fiscal
policies that result in quadripie digit rates of inflation; expenditure patterns
3See, for example, Krueger (1977).on both consumption and investment that result in a great deal of waste4; the
construction of parastatal enterprises to undertake manufacturtng activities,
usually at very high costs; the monopolization of economic activities such as
agricultural distribution by the public sector with gross inefficiencies in the
delivery of inputs and the collection of outputs; price controls over economic
activities; regulation of private investments through licensing; maintenance of
overvalued exchange rates and import licensing regimes with strong disincentives
for exports and consequent "foreign exchange shortage"; and regulation of the
financial system in ways such that real interest rates paid by those receiving
funds are strongly negative while many other producers are precluded from
borrowing channels.
However, governments also undertake activities that are potentially growth
promoting: the construction of essential infrastructure services such as roads,
ports, electicity, and telephones; the provision of education and public health
facilities; maintenance of Law and order; the development of irrigation; and
agricultural research and extension oervices.
In practice, however, not all investment on infrastructure is productive.
In part, political—bureaucratic motivations may lead to expenditures and/or
employment in infrastructure facilities that are nonoptimal. This can occur
because concern is more with maximizing employment than with attaining a social
overhead facility at low coat; it can also occur because regional and other
political situations result in the location, size, or even sector of the
4One of the horror stories emerging from the debt crises of the l980s was
that, in the Philippines, a nuclear power plant had been built at a cost of $4
billion that had never been operated. It takes considerable persuasion to
convince nonprofessionals that the Philippines were lucky relative to countries
where public—sector activities have been the recipients of the majority of
investment, and where they do not cover their operating costs.investment to be uneconomic.In developing countries, stories of investments
(unmaintained) in four—lane highways without significant traffic, sports stadis,
ultramodern sirporta, new capital citiea, and in expanding univeraity capacity
while Leaving many illiterate are too common to ignore.
In addition, government controls, and the incentives they create, affect the
output per unit of input, and its growth, in the private sector. That highly
overvalued exchange rates, extreme levels of protection, credit rationing, labor
market regulations, and other measures are important in many developing countries
cannot be doubted. Most development practitioners believe, and available evidence
suggests, that these practices are important in affecting growth. Again, the
question is how to estimate their relative importance.
One question that has arisen repeatedly in the literature on the growth of
developing countries has been practices which reduce economic efficiency
should also lower the growth rats over time. In the context of a neoclassical
framework, after all, economic inefficiencies generated by controls would shrink
the production possibility frontier inward and thus affect the level of income;
there is no obvious presumed link in theory between the presence of these
practices and the growth rate.
Partial answers have been provided. Firstly, controls seem to intensify
over time and are thus continuously reducing the productivity of existing and new
resources. Secondly, developing countries should be catching up over many years
and controls inhibit the process as the approach to the steady—state is greatly
slowed down. The new growth theory, with its emphasis on cumulative processes,
suggests yet s third reason: if there are externalities in the growth process,
anything that slows down the current rate of growth negatively affects the future
rate of growth.A second question is jf governments would adopt policies inimical to
economic growth. Recent advances in the political economy of development policy
have suggested a number of answers5. In the early development literature, it wae
implicitly assumed chat governments would behave as benevolent social
guardians.6 Experience has shown, however, that governments may instead behave
either as 'autonomous bureaucratic states or as "predatory authoritarian
states", In the former, the bureaucracy in effect governs and behaves to maximize
its power through increasing public employment and the activities undertaken by
the state. In the latter, the dictator, or oligarchic ruling group baa sufficient
political power to extrsct resources from the economy either directly (through
taxation) or indirectly through providing itself services at the expense of the
other sectors. There are also governments in which a number of groups compete for
politicaL power, and in which the ruling coalition's behavior is constrained by
the necessity of maintaining the coalition. In these circumstances, investments
and expenditures in particular sectors or regions, or other uses of governmental
resources, msy in fsct be wise investments in maintaining political power despite
their low or negative productivity for the economy as a whole.
Findlay and Wilson (1987) modelled the behavior of a predstory government.
In their model, the state sllotstes resources toinfrastructureand other goods
5See Lal and Myint (forthcoming), and Krueger (forthcoming) for two
discussions.
It can plausibly be argued that the motivation of many of the nationaList
leaders who led their countries to independence was genuinely idealistic, and
that those leaders based their policies on the assumption that their government
was and would continue to be committed to maximizing social welfare. Even
accepting that motivation, however, it would appear that there hss been
"bureaucratic capture" of governments in many developing countries, as the
sdmnistrative apparatus established to implement government controls over the
economy created bureaucrstic and other interests which then maximized in their
own self—interest.
8insofar as it is in its own self—interest to do so. Real national income is s
function of private sector inputs and of government expenditures enhancing
productivity of the private sector. Findlay and Wilson consider two alternative
objective functions the ruler might have. In the first case, the sovereign is
constrained by a historically given tax rate and must pay pubLic sector employees
the same wage as is received in the private sector. Subject to this, the
sovereign maximizes the surplus, defined as the difference between his taç
revenue and his expenditure (when the expenditures indirectly yield additional
tax revenue, which is the only reason they are made at all). If this model were
correct, ihe sovereigns expenditures on infrastructure snd other investments
enhancing private sector productivity would be suboptimal. In the second version
of their model, however, which appears the more plausible, the sovereign's
surplus is then spent on other categories of goods —bureaucraticoffice holders
who expand their domain insofar as revenues permit it, through, for example,
palaces, sports stadia, and expanded public employment.
In the Findlay—Wilson model, therefore, government expenditures perform two
functions: on one hand, some expenditures enhance the productivity of privste
sector activity, and on the other hand, some expenditures divert resources from
productive uses. Once bureaucratic interests are recognized as a motive in
resource allocation, there is no presumption that even investment expenditures
wiLl be allocated efficiently. In terms of attempting to estimate the impact of
direct government policies, the important challenge is to quantify separateLy the
magnitude of wasteful and of productive expenditures.
Despite the enormous difficulties of segregating various categories of
government activities, the presumed importance of the phenomenon in deveLoping
countries makes an effort worth while. This paper therefore makes a first effortto identify variables that can reflect, at least to same degree, differences in
the productivity of different categories of government activities. In addition
to those activities that are uirectly" reilecceo in government expenditure
accounts, we recognize 'indirect effects on the productivity and growth of
private economic activity that arise through controls imposed by the bureaucracy,
or the sovereign, over private activity.
2. Quantifying Government Activities and Their Effects
The period we cover is 1976/77 to 1980/81. The choice of time period was
determined largely on the basis of data availability. Two other considerations,
however, suggest that use of growth rates over that interval makes sense. First,
there would be difficulties in using growth rates for the first half of the 1980s
because of the differential impact of worldwide conditions on different
countries' growth performances. Second, economic policies do change in developing
countries
Our dependent variable is the rate of growth of real GOP over this period,
using Summers—Heston (1988) estimates of growth rates. As will be seen, data
available for proxying unproductive government expenditures are available on a
relatively consistent basis for at least a few —twenty—six—countriesover that
period. This group of countries includes eleven relatively developed countries8
and fifteen developing countries.9
our sample, Sri Lanka appear to be something of an outlier. A possible
explanation may be that in 1977, an election resulted in a change of government
which proceeded to dismantle economic controls and substantially liberalize the
economy.
5Australta, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, and the U.K..
9Benin, Central African Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Kenya, Korea,
Liberia, Mauritius, Malawi, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, and
Zambia.
10We seek to identify the contributions, both positive end negative, of
government activities to economic growth. To do so, we need four sets of
variables: 1) measures of those government expenditures that enhance private
sector output; 2) indicators of those government expenditures that directly
reduce private sector output; 3) indicators of the indirect negative effect of
government policies on private sector productivity; and 4) measures of the growth
of resources available to the private sector. Here, we describe the measures
used.
2.1 Positive Direct Effects of Government Exoenditures. As a potential
indicator of the posittve product ofdirectgovernment economic activity the
availabLe measure ——givenour negative measure defined below ——wasthe level
of output of state owned enterprises (SOfa). These enterprises cover a range of
activities, including provision of power, irrigation, and transport (railroads
and ports especially) services that presumably enhance private sector output,
although they also include the value added of state marketing boards, and
parsatatal enterprises engaged tn such diverse activities as manufacturing,
mining, and tourism. Insofar as marketing boards suppress producer prices of
agricultural commodities, those activities would not be reflected in measures of
the value of their output. Unfortunately, a split between the output of SOfa by
major economic activity i5 not comprehensively available. When public sector
output is produced inefficiently, using a measure of inputs to reflect the
negative contribution of government will, we hope, reflect this (see Sect. 2.2).
In the regression results reported below, the variable used is public sector
enterprise output as a fraction of nonagriculturaL GHP.10 Note that since
10 There are few available estimates of the values of SOfoutput on a
consistent basis across countries. We use data from Short (1984) and Nair and
Filippides (1988). These estimates generally pertain to the 1976—80 period.
11governments outputs of nonpriced services are not captured by thia proxy, to the
extent theee contribute to growth, the net direct effect of government ta
probabiy biased downward.
2.2. Direct Government Exoenditures that are Wasteful. In all models of
government behavior, the resources employed by government subtract from those
available for private economic activity. For that reaaon, we uae the ratio of
public aeotor employment to total nonagricultural employment as a proxy for the
negative direct impact of government expenditures. Clesrly, if the output of
state owned enterprises is a reasonably vslid proxy for the positive effects of
government expenditures, then s measure of the resources used by government can
serve aa an indicator of the negstive impact of government: estimating a "net
direot effect can then be done by combining the two impacts.11
2.3 Indirect Nerative Effects of Government. The governmental economic
policies that affect the efficiency of private sector resource allocation may
also affect economic growth. Many of these policies have been analyzed and
quantified for particular groups of developing countries in the literature.12
Two sets of policies whose effects have been shown to be strongly negattve
are thooe affecting the trade and psy,sento regime and those which suppress the
ftnanctsl sector. We sought proxies that might reflect the extent to which the
credit market and the foreign exchange market were, in the period under review,
11No international organization publishes data separately identifying public
employment. The most comprehensive data are available in Heller and Tait (1984)
and pertain for most countries to 1979 or 1980.
RSeeLittle, Stitovsky and Scott (1970) for the first major cross—country
analysis. See also Bhsgwati (1978) and Krueger (1978, 1983) for trade policies,
MoKinnon (forthcoming) for financial policies, and Krueger, Schiff and Valdes
(1988) for agrioultural pricing policies.
12distorted by government policies. In the case of the trade snd payments regime,
we use the percentage premium of the black market exchange rate13 relative to
the official exchange rate. Although no messure is perfect, there is reason to
believe that there is a significant relationship between the height of the bLack
market premium and the restrictiveness of the trade regime. An alternative
approach might have been to attempt to estimate deviations of real exchange rates
from some base year purchasing—power—parity exchange rate. The difficulty with
this procedure would have been to attempt to identify reasonably comparable base
years across countries.
For the financial market, governments often ration credit through controls
upon interest rates and through instructions, or guidance', as to how banks
should allocate their lending across economic activities. There is clearly more
scope for such guidance the lower is the nominal interest rate relative to the
one which wouLd clear the market. To reflect this acroaa countries, we
constructed a measure of the real interest rate by taking in general the deposit
interest rate deflated by the inflation rate in the estimation period.14
Clearly, the expectation isthatthe estimated coefficient on the real
interest rate will be positive: the less negative it is, the lees likely is
credit to be misallocated across economic activities. For the black market
premium, the coefficient is expected to be negative: a larger premium presumably
reflects a more negative effect on output and growth.
2.4 Growth in Private Sector Resources, Here, we seek to be as traditional
as possible, and consistent with measures used by Barro and others. The
13Datafrom World Currency Yearbook (formerly Pick's) were collated by Wood
(1988). We use Wood's data.
14Eatimates were also made using the GDP deflator, rather than the consumer
price index, as en estimator of inflation. There was no difference in results.
13importance of human capital has been recognized by both development economists
and the new growth theorists. Indeed, in the works of Romer and others, education
may be one source of externalities. Romer (1986) and others believe that growth
rates should be positively associated with the initial level of human capital
stock. For the countries we include in our estimates, we take the enrollment in
secondary school as a proporticn of the population age 12 to 17 in 1965 as our
variable
Ingeneral, the initial level of capital stock is expected to be positively
correlated with the level of per capita income and, if there are externalities,
with growth. The rate of growth of the capiial stock ought to be positively
correlated with the growth rate. We constructed two measures to take this into
accouni. A real capital stock index was calculated using perpetual inventory
methods, iaking the 1960 ratio of GOP to investment as having reflected the
capital output ratio at that time, and then adding new investment and
depreciating capital for subsequent years, using Summers and Heston data. For the
second measure, we took a simple average of real investment to GOP ratios for the
1960—76 period, aa used by Barro. Neither variable proved helpful: the signs were
negative, sometimes significantly so. It is not clear why this occurred, and the
capital stock variable was omitted from the regression estimates reported below.
3. Results
The regression estimates are shown in Table 1. The first equation reports
the results when the average real rate of growth is related only to the initial
(logged) level of average per capita income in 1976/77, public sector employment,
and output of public sector enterprises. As can be seen, only public sector
employment is significant: a one percentage point increase in the ratio of
15flata were obtained from World Bank (1990).
14government employrsenc to the nonagricultural labor farce reduces the estimated
rate of growth by eight one hundredths of one percent.
The second equation adds proxies for the effects of the trade and payments
regiae and credit rationing on the growth rate. These variables are highly
significant and add greatly to the explanatory power of the estimating equation.
In addition, when controlling for employment effects, an increase in the share
of state owned enterprises in nonagricultural output is positively and
significantly related to growth. Public employment is significantly negatively
related as before. These results are certainly consistent with the hypothesis
that direct government activities contain a positive component (output) and a
negative component. As expected, a one percentage point higher real interest rate
is associated wtth a 0.24 percent increase in the real rate of growth. The black
market premium, also as expected, has a significant negative impact on the growth
rate.
Includtng both direct and indirect effects of governmental activities alone
in equation (3) results in an equation capable of accounting for just under 50
percant of the variation in output growth rates, which suggests the importance
of both direct and indirect government activities upon the rate of growth. The
signs, aagntcude, and signtficance of the direct output effects remain much the
same as before and conform again to the Findlay—Wilson hypothesis.
The fourth and fifth equation in Table I incorporate the human capital
variable into the estimation. Education is in general positively related to
growth, although it is not stgntftcant at the 90 percent level and is unstable
for changes in the number of regressors.
Table 2 provtdes estimates of the predicted direct and indirect effects of
government sctivtties on per capita output growth in the 26 countries, using the
15results of equation (3) from Table I. In computing predicted growth, the constant
term and effects of government activities are included. As is readily apparent,
governments appear in many countries to have a large negative impact upon
economic growth. The elasticities of public sector employment and state—owned—
enterprise output, exsmined at the means, are negative 1.28 and positive 1.01
percent, indicating a proportionate rise in both has a relatively small net
negative effect upon output growth.
The indirect effects are generally larger than the direct effects (averaging
around minus one percentage point) and range from plus 0.3 percent to minus 5.7
percent. The elasticities of changes in the real interest rates and the exchange
premium are 0.31 and negative 0.37 percent respectively.
Those countries for which actual growth deviated moat from the predicted rate
include Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Zambia, and the Central African Republic. Sri Lanka,
as already mentioned, underwent a strong liberalization program starting in 1977.
Tanzania, the CAR and Zambia experienced declines in their growth ratea in the
early l980a.
Evaluated ac their means, both the direct and the indirect effects of
government are more negative in developing compared with developed countries.
rndeed, according Co these estimates, the difference in actual growth rates
between che two groups was more chan accounted for by the difference in
government policies. Stated another way, the fifteen developing countries for
which the relevant data were available experienced on (unweighted) average about
1.4 percent leas annual average growth in per capita income than did the
developed countries. If these estimates are used as a basis for compuiaiion, if
developing countries governments activities had been the same as those of
developeo countries, che formers growth rates would have been 0.5 percentage
iipoints higher than the Latter.
4. Conciusion
Equations which use a growth rate aa a dependent variable are notoriousLy
difficuLt because of the inherent difficuLties in specifying the underLying modeL
correctLy, and even of estimating the true growth rate. The results presented
here are highLy tentative. Perhaps the surprise should be that any variables
were strongLy significant, and yet the apparent impact of governmentaL activities
on output growth show up strsngly across the forms of the equations used here.
In Light of data Limitations, these resuLts are clearly preLiminary. They
strongiy point to the need for further research into the combined impact of
factor accumulation and government activities upon economic growth. A major
barrter to that research is the Lack of the reLevant data on anything Like a
comparable basis across countries. We hope that our contribution may stimulate
not onLy further analysis using other sources of data, but also in spurring the
deveLopment of better and more consistent data across countries covering the roLe
of government in the economy.
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20Table 1: Estimation Results: Dependent Variable GDPPCDCT
Regression Number
Indep. Var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 4.65 8.52** 3.23*** 15.23***3.56***
(1.11) (2.32) (4.46) (2.90) (3.01)
LGDPPC76 —0.10 —0.61 _l.70**
(0.21) (1.47) (2.27)
PUB _0.08***_O.07*** _0.06*** _0.08*** _0.06**
(2.86) (3.34) (2.94) (3.74) (2.79)
SOEGDP 0.04 0.15** 0.13** 0.13** 0.13**
(0.80) (2.78) (2.43) (2.60) (2.39)
REALINT 0.24** 0.21* 0.19* 0.22*
(2.21) (1.92) (1.74) (1.89)
—0.04** —0.04* _0.04** _0.04*




D0F. 22 20 21 19 20
Adj. RSQ 0.30 0.51 0.48 0.55 0.46
F—Stat. 4.62** 6.20*** 6.83***6.16*** 5.26***
SSE 81.70 52.22 57.84 45.21 57.48
NB: Numbers in brackets are t-statistjcs
*significantat 90 percent level
**significantat 95 percent level
***significantat 99 percent level
Data Definitions:
GDPPCCOT: average percentage per annum growth rate over 1976/77
to 1980/81
LGDPPC76: log of average per capita income 1976/77
percentage share of total public tonon—agricultural
employment
SOEGDP: percentage share of total output of SOE5 to non-
agricultural output
REALINT:deposit interest rate deflated by c:
BMPREN:percentage premium ofblackmarket over official
exchange rate
SECEDN: percentage secondary school enrollments to totalTable 2: Predicted Direct and Indirect Government Effects
Actual Government Effects Dif 5.
Growth Actual
Rate DirectIndirectTotal to Pred.
Developed Countries:
Australia 1.6 —0.3 —0.2 —0.5 —1.1 Austria 2.5 0.7 0.3 1.0 —1.7 Denmark 1.7 —0.7 —0.0 —0.8 —0.8
France 2.2 —0.4 —0.6 —1.0 —0.1
Germany 2.8 0.2 0.1 0.3 —0.7
Ireland 3.5 —0.3 —0.7 —1.0 1.2
Italy 4.0 —0.1 —0.5 —0.6 1.3
Netherlands 1.3 —0.6 0.2 —0.4 —1.6
Portugal 3.3 1.6 —1.6 0.1 —0.0
Spain 2.2 —0.3 —0.8 —1.1 0.1 UnitedKingdom 1.5 -0.3 -0.9 —1.2 —0.6
Developing Countries:
Benin —0.2 —3.0 —0.4 —3.5 0.0
Cent. Afr. Rep —1.6 —1.0 —1.1 —2.0 —2.8
Egypt 5.5 2.8 —2.3 0.5 1.8
Guatemala 1.7 —0.8 —0.1 —0.9 —0.6 India 1.2 —2.2 0.1 —2.1 0.1
Kenya 1.6 —0.6 —1.8 —2.4 0.8
Korea,Rep. of 3.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Liberia —2.9 —2.0 —3.1 —5.1 —0.9
Malawj —0.2 —0.2 —3.1 —3.4 —0.0
Maurjtius —0.4 —1.3 —0.5 —2.3 —1.3
Philippines 2.8 —1.2 —0.8 —2.0 1.5
Sri Lanka 4.5 —0.8 —1.5 —2.3 3.6
Tanzania —0.1 —0.7 —4.9 —5.6 2.3
Thailand 4.5 —0.6 —0.1 —0.6 1.9
Zambia —4.5 1.1 —5.7 —4.6 —3.1
SimpleAverages:
Developed 2.4 —0.0 —0.4 —0.5 —0.4
Developing i.o —0.7 —1.7 —2.4 0.2
Total 1.6 —0.4 —1.1 —1.6 —0.0
Sources: Calculated from regression (3) in Table 1
Differences calculated taking the actual less the
total predicted value less the constant